Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment — 21 March 2022
More from the ETO today:
· The ISW assessrep for 21 March 2022.
o Russian general offensive is completely halted. Mariupol and Kershon are the only areas which the Russian Army continues to maintain offensive momentum.
o Russia continues to be in “deep kimchi” as Belarussian railway workers are refusing to transport Russian equipment and supplies to RA forces in Ukraine. This will impact the salient around western Kyiv in particular. However, Russian supply shortages are impacting the entire invasion force. A semi-comical moment caught on CCTV outside a Kershon gas station recorded Russian soldiers pulling their tank up to a pump and looting the store.
o Elsewhere, and on a related note, Ukrainian forces are beginning to dislodge the Russians from Kyiv suburbs, and are beginning to mount counter offensives in other parts of the country.
o No updated map from JominW today. Maps on ISW report provide good snapshots of key areas of interest.
· The Ruble to USD exchange rate is currently 106:1. This is not a significant change from yesterday.
· As we’ve discussed previously, the current war has shown just how influential social media is to OSINT collection and analysis. Even more interesting is the number of OSINT integrators and subject matter experts that are using social media platforms, like Twitter, to share their analysis. Here is a compiled list of 10 OSINT integrators/SMEs on Twitter. Two additional items of interest are how the US has used social media to cast a light on the backroom deals between Xi and Putin which has produced the immediate effect of getting Xi to back off of his tacit support or Russia, and how the UK MoD and the Ukr MoD have pushed daily INTSUMs on Twitter to counter Russian propaganda.
· POTUS warns of a Russian chemical attack as Putin grows increasingly desperate. The article claims that POTUS did not cite evidence of this conclusion, however, there is ample evidence over the last two weeks to suggest that Putin is attempting to establish a like-kind response by making false claims about US-Ukrainian bioweapon development labs in Ukraine. If you’ve read any of the comments on social media (please do yourself the favor and don’t), then you’ve probably seen Russian trolls and Q-susceptible Americans repeating these allegations (don’t feed the trolls). Anyways, it is unclear why the AP would suggest that POTUS is not citing evidence, when it is clear in his remarks that he is citing Putin’s typical pattern of behavior of projecting the kinds of behavior on his target that he intends to take.
· As the war in Ukraine evolves, a few things are clear about US defense posture:
o Russia is not the conventional land/air behemoth that most western strategists and analysts believed. Despite the vast gulf between their capabilities and their ambitions, until or unless Putin is deposed in favor of a more benign regime, Russia still remains a threat. And we have, as yet, to see a true determinant of their maritime capability for better or for worse (the sailing of the smoking heap of an aircraft carrier, the Kuznetsov, in 2016 doesn’t really count for the whole of the Russian Navy).
o Credible deterrence against Russia must include US and allied heavy armored formations. In Army parlance, a heavy brigade is viewed like a Carrier Air Group. Light forces mean, “we’re really upset and you.” Heavy forces mean, “Try it and found out”, or FAFO.
o That said, it is now clear that China is the top contender, and the other pole in the now-bipolar world order. Land force adaptation will not and cannot take the same shape for the Pacific and Chinese deterrence as it must take for Russian deterrence. As we’ve already seen in some emerging US concepts, this will translate to light, expeditionary forces with significant A2AD teeth to deny SLOCs and free up naval and airpower to conduct offensive operations as needed. It remains to be seen how this will shape the thinking of our allies south of the SCS.
o Though the Chinese have spent a great deal of time and energy in ripping off US technology upgrading their forces, they lack any relevant operational experience in force projection and expeditionary logistics. The last direct conflict with the US was in Korea. Beyond that, they do not possess anything but a theoretical understanding of expeditionary warfare. Given that we know they are keenly aware of Russian foibles in Ukraine, flexing a little US muscle with an increased presence and posture may check their belligerence.
Thank you,
~Eric (Token Army Guy)
